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Abstract 
This essay reconstructs the way in which Jürgen Moltmann tells the story of God’s 
work. This is done on the basis of a review essay by Douglas Farrow who identifies 
a neo-Platonic structure in Moltmann’s systematic contributions to theology. The 
argument of this essay is that Moltmann fails to distinguish adequately between 
creation and fall. This has significant implications for his understanding of 
salvation, church and eschatological consummation. In this way theology becomes 
preoccupied with the doctrine of providence and thus with the theodicy problem.  
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Introduction 
How is Jürgen Moltmann telling the story of God’s work (on earth)? This necessarily 
complex question is in Moltmann’s case difficult to answer for at least three reasons:  
 Firstly, there is the size of his oeuvre. It is obviously not easy to condense all his 
writings into a single essay. Moreover, there is a gigantic corpus of secondary literature 
that has to be taken into account – in terms of articles, postgraduate theses and Fest-
schriften.1 The richness and scope of his writings would at least allow one to reconstruct 
such a narrative since he has written extensively about basically all the ‘chapters’ of this 
story – creation, evolution, human emergence, sin, providence, redemption, church, 
ministry and mission and eschatological consummation. Although there are some dis-
continuities in Moltmann’s thinking, there is no obvious need here to distinguish 
between an ‘earlier’ Moltmann and a ‘later’ Moltmann.2 
 Secondly, although Moltmann is clearly attracted to narratives and at times adopts the 
                                                 
1  See the Festschriften edited by Deuser et al 1986, Volf, Krieg & Kucharz 1996, Moltmann & Rivuzumwami 
2002, Volf & Welker 2006. Although the contributions in these Festschriften often (but not always) engage 
with Moltmann’s writings, there is seldom a thorough analysis or critique of his work. In terms of authors 
with an interest in Moltmann’s ecological theology, the contributions by Bauckham 1987, 1999, Bouma-
Prediger 1995, Deane-Drummond 1997 and Schuurman 1991 may be mentioned. 
2  This is also evident from Moltmann’s extensive autobiographical comments (see 1997, 2000). I wish to 
highlight two significant changes that Moltmann himself recognises in his oeuvre. Firstly, there is a shift from 
the historical categories of promise and hope in his earlier theology towards the inclusion of the spatial 
category of indwelling in his later work (see 1999:111 and the Festschrift edited by Moltmann & 
Rivuzumwami 2002). One may argue that this spatial turn is precisely prompted by his preoccupation with the 
theodicy problem: Where is God amidst planetary suffering? See Mertens 2002. Moltmann’s response draws 
on the spatial categories of presence, solidarity, Shekinah, oikos and perichoresis. Secondly, in his series of 
six ‘systematic contributions to theology’ Moltmann came to recognise that solidarity with liberation, black, 
feminist and Minjung theologies would only be possible on the basis of engaging with his own German 
context and through conversations with others from within this context. 
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notion of theology as biography,3 he cannot really be described as a ‘narrative 
theologian’. His ‘exploration’ of themes in Christian doctrine is deliberately not an 
attempt to construct a theological system or a systematic theology, but a series of 
‘systematic contributions to theology’, that is, contributions from within the sub-
discipline of systematic theology to the wider task of theological reflection and from 
within the German context to wider ecumenical conversations.4 He does not seek to 
integrate his explorations logically, chronologically or in any other order, also not a 
narrative order. He eschews any attempt at comprehensiveness, any dogmatic ‘coercion’ 
as hubris.  Perhaps his style of writing could best be described in terms of a theologia 
viatorum, through an ongoing dialogue with a wide range of ecumenical conversation 
partners. It may also be described as one of ‘experimentation’5 and ‘exploration’ – not 
merely the exploration of a series of Christian doctrines, but of a rich cluster of 
theological symbols vibrating with each other. It is fairly easy to list some of these 
symbols reverberating in Moltmann’s oeuvre: adventus, doxa / kavod, joy, liberation, 
Messiah, nova creatio, oikos, pathos, perichoresis, promissio, ruah, Sabbath, Shekinah, 
theologia viatorum and zimsum. 
 Thirdly, and perhaps precisely as a result of such an exploratory approach, Moltmann 
has often been criticised for a certain conceptual looseness. Critics have pointed out 
contradictions, a lack of clarity, imprecise formulations, unresolved questions and in 
some cases an all too speculative tendency in his work, engaging selectively with the 
Christian tradition and departing from the biblical narratives perhaps too easily. Molt-
mann’s admirers typically suggest that this is more than made up for by the richness and 
boldness of his explorations.6  
In this contribution I will take as a point of departure a review essay by the British/ 
Canadian theologian Douglas Farrow published in 1998. In this essay, entitled “In the end 
is the beginning”, Farrow offers a review of the first five of Moltmann’s series of theolo 
gical explorations. Although Farrow is highly appreciative of Moltmann’s contributions,7 
he is also severe in his criticism. What is helpful about his review is that he suggests what 
may here be called a story-line for how Moltmann is telling the story of God’s work.  
Farrow’s argument is that the underlying thought pattern of Moltmann’s version of the 
story, notwithstanding Moltmann’s own critique of the influence of Hellenistic categories 
on Christian theology,8 remains neo-Platonic in structure.9 The story as reconstructed by 
                                                 
3  See Moltmann 2000:xviii-xix. Moltmann often offers moving autobiographical comments to illustrate the 
contextual nature of his work. See especially his Experiences in theology (2000) as well as his recent 
autobiography A broad place (2008). Given the available literature on his life, I opted not to add a 
biographical section here. 
4  See the preface (dated 1990) to the paperback edition of The Trinity and the kingdom of God (1981:vii) as 
well as the preface to Experiences in theology (2000:xvi). The category of ‘contributions’ is here understood 
by Moltmann as supplementing the work of liberation theologians, feminist theologians and black theologians 
from within his own ‘First world’ context. 
5  This is how Moltmann described his approach in Theology of hope. See also his The experiment hope (1975). 
6  As Douglas Farrow (1998:427) observes, “While it is commonly held that Moltmann’s conceptual looseness 
and spotty engagement with the tradition exacerbate his readers’ difficulties…, it is also widely agreed that 
the seminality of his thought goes a long way to compensate for that.” 
7  Farrow (1998:426) says, for example, “If theology today shows signs not only of flexibility but of serious 
disarray, this one project is sufficient evidence that the discipline is far from moribund.” 
8  See Moltmann’s discussion (1967:259-260) on Greek versus Hebrew concepts of history (the concept of 
history is a creation of Hebrew prophecy). He criticises a notion of revelation in terms of the Greek notion of 
logos, namely as the epiphany of the eternal present of being (1967:40). A discussion of the Hellenistic 
influence on Christian theology abounds in rest of his oeuvre. 
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Farrow entails, in short, the following episodes:  
1) Creation as emanation from the eternal triune God following the kenotic self-
withdrawal of God (zimsum) to create / vacate space within Godself for the world to 
come into being;  
2) An increasing alienation between God and a creation suffering from the threat of a 
primordial nihil, from being godforsaken, from mortality and from sin – which also 
renders God vulnerable and induces God’s own suffering;  
3) The history of redemption through which God overcomes such alienation by 
reoccupying the world through the indwelling of the Spirit and the incarnation of Christ, 
culminating in the events of the cross and resurrection of Jesus Christ;  
4) The movement of the Spirit to affirm all forms of life through the indwelling Spirit and 
through the ministries and mission of the church based on the promises of God; and  
5) The consummation of all things which is understood in terms of the mutual indwelling 
(perichoresis) of God in the world and the world in God, perhaps best portrayed in the 
symbol of the Sabbath feast. 
I will investigate this narrative in more detail below. Here it should also be noted that 
Farrow detects such a neo-Platonic thought pattern not only with reference to the work of 
God but also with reference to the person of God. Farrow suggests that the underlying 
scheme in Moltmann’s work is indeed circular. There is a move from theology (the 
immanent trinity) to pneumatology (the history of creation) to Christology (the turning 
point) to pneumatology (the history of redemption) to an eschatological trinitarian 
theology.10 
Of course, the brevity of this account cannot do justice to Moltmann’s rich oeuvre. One 
may also argue that his thought patterns are not so much neo-Platonic as it is Hegelian.11 I 
have heard that Moltmann has confessed that such a Hegelian inclination “is merely what is 
to be expected from a German professor”. This does not imply that Moltmann seeks to 
build an entire Hegelian system (which he repeatedly criticises); it refers to his habit of 
seeking to overcome the dialectical tension between a thesis and an antithesis.12  
                                                                                                                            
9  Farrow (1998:431-432) says: “He [Moltmann] flies not from Platonism but into it by embracing 
emanationism.” 
10  I will not explore Moltmann’s contributions to the person of God here at any length. See also Tang’s doctoral 
thesis on God’s history in the theology of Jürgen Moltmann (1996) which addresses Moltmann’s understand-
ing of both the immanent and the economic trinity. See also the Festschrift for Moltmann edited by Volf & 
Welker (2006) which explores his trinitarian theology at some length. Obviously this begs questions about his 
understanding of the relationship between the economic trinity and the immanent trinity. Following Rahner, 
Moltmann seeks to overcome this distinction on the basis of a theology of the cross and on the basis of an 
understanding of reciprocity (perichoresis). What transpires at the cross is also an event within the trinity. 
Elsewhere Moltmann (1981:152) describes the relationship between language on the economic and the 
immanent trinity in terms of narrating the history of salvation and thanksgiving, praise and joy (doxology) for 
such experiences of salvation. 
11  See, however, also Moltmann’s critical engagement with Hegel in a discussion of God’s self-glorification (not 
self-realisation) in the final section of The coming of God (1996:326ff). Perhaps the core of Moltmann’s 
criticism of Hegel may be found in his thoroughly trinitarian theology. For Hegel there is only a single divine 
subject who passes through the phases of externalisation and dialectical Aufhebung. Moltmann (1996:330) 
describes Hegel’s triadic analysis of the Absolute as ‘modalism in the extreme form’ 
12  For example, never shy of resolving long-standing theological quarrels, Moltmann seeks to overcome the schism 
between Christianity and Judaism and between the East and the West over the filioque. He challenges the 
unfruitful grounding of theology both in the ontology of substance and the metaphysics of transcendental 
subjectivity and proposes instead a metaphysics of relationality and community. He challenges a one-sided 
emphasis on either God’s transcendence or God’s immanence; the radical distinction between God and the world 
is overcome by their mutual perichoresis in God’s Spirit. His Messianic Christology challenges both a 
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The suggestion that a certain neo-Platonism underlies Moltmann’s entire oeuvre would 
also run against much of what he is saying. Here one may mention his early emphasis on 
the history-creating promises of God,13 the hope for the emergence of that which is new 
instead of a contemplative search for that which is abiding,14 his persistent critique of 
various forms of dualism, his appreciation of that which material, bodily and earthly,15 his 
understanding of God as passionate, vulnerable and in solidarity with creation, and so forth. 
It is therefore not quite clear that Moltmann is indeed vulnerable to the criticism of a 
persistent neo-Platonism.  
For this contribution, I initially intended to defend Moltmann against Farrow’s critique. 
However, I have been persuaded that such a circular structure may indeed be found in 
Moltmann’s story-line. In this contribution I wish to investigate, instead, one aspect of the 
story-line that seems to have repercussions for all the others, namely his tendency to 
conflate two sources of (human) suffering, namely suffering as a result of what is usually 
described as ‘natural suffering’ and as a result of the legacy of human sin. I will seek to 
demonstrate that this has repercussions for several other aspects of his theology.  
 
Theology as Theodicy 
Moltmann’s entire oeuvre may be construed as a theological response to the immense 
human and planetary suffering which defined the twentieth century. In every major book 
Moltmann has addressed this problem – with reference to Auschwitz, Hiroshima, racism, 
the cold war, ecological degradation, poverty, the oppression of women in patriarchal 
societies, the suffering of innocent children, and so forth. His political theology is an anti-
bourgeois theology standing in solidarity with the victims of modernity,16 not a progressive 
theology of the established middle classes.17 Here theodicy indeed becomes the primary 
theological task.  
Moltmann argues that theodicy does not require an explanation for suffering – since that 
would somehow justify it and render it acceptable. He insists that his theology of the cross 
should not be understood as an answer to the theodicy problem. Instead, it is “the power to 
live with the open wound of the unanswerable but unrelinquishable question to God: ‘My 
                                                                                                                            
metaphysical Christology ‘from above’ and an anthropological Christology ‘from below’ by proposing a non-
triumphalist Christology of the Way en route to the renewal of all things (Christ is the one who is coming to us in 
our journey on the way from ahead). He seeks to undermine the tension between revealed theology and natural 
theology and between revelation (‘a theology for pastors and priests’) and experience (‘a pre-eminently lay 
theology’) by calling for an appreciation of the richness of an experience of the Spirit’s presence in creation (see 
1992:5f, 17f). He integrates the doctrines of justification and sanctification on the basis of a universalist 
affirmation of life. He rejects as false the contrast between an eschatology transposed into time and an 
eschatology transposed into eternity and retrieves a notion of eschatology as the coming of Christ (adventus) as 
the fulfilment of the history-creating promises of God (see especially the chapter on ‘Promise and history’ in 
Theology of hope, 1967:95-138, also 1967:165). Finally, he seeks to overcome the distinction between the 
economic trinity and the immanent trinity on the basis of the notion of reciprocity within a loving relationship: the 
work of God ad extra influences the relationships within the trinity and vice versa (1981:98, 151). Farrow 
(1998:436) observes: “As Moltmann sees it, the primordial Trinity (God open to the world) is perfected via the 
economy (God suffering with the world) into an eternal or doxological trinity (God glorified in the world)”. 
13  See especially Theology of Hope, the volumes edited by Muckenhirn (1968), Capps (1970) and Herzog 
(1970), and the early study by Christopher Morse (1979) on The logic of promise in Moltmann’s theology. 
14  See, for example, Moltmann 1967:289.  
15  See, for example, the discussion on the bodily resurrection of Christ and the hope for the resurrection of the 
body in The Way of Jesus Christ (Moltmann 1990:252ff). 
16  See Moltmann’s comments on the notion of ‘sub-modernity’ (1999:11ff).  
17  See Moltmann 1999:57.  
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God, why have you forsaken me?’”18 What is therefore required is a protest against 
suffering – God’s own protest.19 Only in this way can God be justified (theodicy). In short, 
Moltmann’s answer is that the world as such, with all its suffering, is involved in God’s 
very self-constitution as a God of love, that is, a God who becomes vulnerable by being in a 
reciprocal relationship with the object of God’s love. This vulnerability is evident from the 
perichoretic relationships within the (immanent) trinity and is replicated in the history of 
the triune God’s engagement with the world that God created. For Moltmann, only a 
thoroughly trinitarian theology can account for God’s suffering and can counter a 
monarchical understanding of God.20 Following Bonhoeffer, Moltmann insists again and 
again that only a suffering God can be credible to humankind today.  
Despite Moltmann’s critique against attempts to explain suffering, it is important to 
investigate his account of what I have elsewhere described as the ‘sources of suffering’. My 
suggestion is that one may differentiate between a number of such sources of suffering, 
including 1) natural suffering that is embedded in God’s good creation irrespective of 
human sin (there was sickness and death on earth long before there were humans or human 
sin); 2) suffering which result from what may be called ‘historical contingency’ – where no 
one can be held accountable directly; 3) the (long-term) impact of one’s careless and 
malicious actions and destructive habits on oneself (often in response to the actions of 
others); 4) suffering induced directly by another person (being ‘sinned-against’) and 5) 
suffering which results from structural violence, that is, the long term impact of human sin 
on the way in which societies are structured – where everyone is accountable, albeit to 
various degrees, and everyone experiences suffering, again to various degrees.21 
In terms of this analysis one may argue that Moltmann, throughout his career, has 
protested against structural violence and has pleaded for the victims of society, those who 
have been sinned against.22 There can be little doubt that his youthful experiences during 
the Nazi regime have prompted a life-time commitment to a political theology that could 
address such suffering. Political theology was indeed born after the war from the horror 
over the failure of the German church and theology to address the crimes against humanity 
associated with Auschwitz.23 
Given his acute sense of the difference between the suffering of the victims and the very 
different forms of suffering experienced by oppressors, Moltmann has consistently re-
frained from universalising discourse on sin. The Christian message of redemption can only 
be made cheap (Bonhoeffer) where a generalised message of God’s forgiveness is pro-
claimed without bringing the distinction between oppressors and their victims into play.  
Moltmann’s position still requires a response to the question where the sins of the 
oppressors come from in the first place. Moltmann is quite aware of the apostle Paul’s 
                                                 
18  Moltmann 2008:281. 
19  See already Moltmann (1967:21): “Hope finds in Christ not only a consolation in suffering, but also the 
protest of the divine promise against suffering … hope causes not rest but unrest, not patience but 
impatience.” See also Moltmann 1974:200ff. 
20  Farrow (1998:426) notes that, for Moltmann, “only a robust trinitarianism which has eradicated all 
monarchian tendencies can supply a decisive critique of the culture of domination and ‘possessive 
individualism’ against which suffering peoples and a suffering planet are crying out.” 
21 For a more detailed discussion of these sources of suffering, see Conradie 2005, 2006. 
22  See also the discussion on ‘Deliver us from evil’ in Moltmann 2004:53-78. 
23 See Moltmann 2000:115. In The crucified God Moltmann (1974:xi) wrote: “I experienced a very ‘dark night’ 
in my soul, for the pictures of Bergen-Belsen concentration camp and horror over the crimes of Auschwitz, 
had weighed on me and many other people of my generation since 1945.  Much time passed before we could 
emerge from the silence that stops the mouths of people over whom the cloud of the victims hangs heavy.” 
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comment that we have all sinned (Romans 3:23) and that we humans are therefore 
collectively accountable for sin. However, his intuition is that it would be obscene to 
universalise human guilt in the cases of Auschwitz, Hiroshima, the Gulag, the victims of 
racism and genocide, the poverty of those marginalised by a neo-liberal economy, the plight 
of women in patriarchal societies and also the non-human victims of environmental 
degradation.24  
Although Moltmann therefore refuses to universalise human guilt, his response to the 
problem of the origin of sin is to view human sin as a manifestation of the suffering that is 
embedded in God’s creation. Although he resists the temptation to generalise human 
accountability, he has little hesitation in literally universalising suffering. On this basis I 
suggest that Moltmann tends to conflate two sources of suffering, namely natural suffering 
and suffering resulting from human sin. Human sin is seen as an almost necessary and 
inevitable result of the suffering embedded in God’s good creation. Indeed suffering is 
already implied in God’s resolve to create. For Moltmann suffering is a function of the 
vulnerability that is implied in a reciprocal relationship of love where the response of the 
beloved cannot be taken for granted. This vulnerability is evident from the history of God’s 
love for creation and therefore also characterises the relationships of love within the triune 
God – epitomised by the paradox of God’s own godforsakenness as expressed in the cross 
of Jesus Christ.  
This fusion of natural suffering and human sin as sources of suffering (and therefore of 
creation and sin) has implications for every aspect of Moltmann’s account of God story. It 
requires, for example a radicalisation of the message of redemption. If the victims are not 
responsible for their suffering, then no human beings can ultimately be responsible. The 
only way out is to hold God responsible. Theology thus becomes theodicy.25 The only way 
in which God can be declared just in the face of human and other forms of suffering is to 
proclaim universal salvation. 
Let us now explore each step of Moltmann’s theodicy with reference to the various 
‘chapters’ of God’s work. I will again draw on Farrow’s reconstruction but also on 
Moltmann’s own texts.  
 
God’s Primordial Self-withdrawal and Vulnerability 
Like many other twentieth century theologians Moltmann is keen to move away from a 
portrayal of the triune God as apathetic and distant from the world. He thus avoids 
speculation about a protological trinity and subsequently temporalises the immanent trinity. 
God is the one who exists within time and cannot be understood as separate from us. This 
implies that God is open to time, influenced by historical changes and therefore affected by 
suffering. Especially in The Trinity and the Kingdom Moltmann stresses the pathos of God 
above God as logician, a supreme substance or an Absolute subject.26 Accordingly, he 
speaks of God as love and on this basis as the God who freely limits Godself by that which 
                                                 
24  In Theology of hope (1967:23) Moltmann describes sin primarily in terms of the sin of despair: “It is not the 
evil he does, but the good he does not do, not his misdeed but his omissions, that accuse him.” 
25  One may argue that where theology becomes a response to the theodicy problem, all the other ‘chapters’ of 
God story tend to be subsumed under the doctrine of providence. However, this is hardly the case in 
Moltmann’s work since he discusses the themes of creation, redemption and consummation extensively. It is 
nevertheless noteworthy that he has not produced a monograph on the theme of God’s providence, probably 
because this infuses all his work. 
26  Moltmann 1981:1-20. 
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is not God, by creation, the object of God’s love.27 A relationship between God and the 
world based on reciprocity necessarily implies God’s vulnerability, solidarity, com-
passion,28 self-surrender and therefore the ‘infinite sorrow of God’.29 This also compels 
Moltmann to talk about God in Christological terms. Thus, from beginning to end, his 
theology is geared towards a response to the theodicy problem. 
In his panentheistic ktisiology Moltmann maintains that suffering not only belongs to 
God but that some form of suffering is inevitable for creation itself. Although creation is 
good, the object of God’s joy and geared towards the celebration of the Sabbath,30 it 
remains finite and imperfect. God’s pain in giving birth to the world31 anticipates the pain 
of incarnation and cross as well as the groaning of the Spirit for a new creation.32  
The key to Moltmann’s position here is his controversial use of the kabbalistic notion of 
God’s primordial self-restriction or self-withdrawal (zimzum).33 This suggests that God 
allowed room within Godself for the emergence of something that is different from Godself 
(extra Deum), a world that exist in front of, with and in Godself.34 Moltmann describes the 
doctrine of zimzum as “the only serious attempt ever made to think through the idea of 
‘creation out of nothing’ in a truly theological way.”35 What should be noted here is that 
this very act makes God vulnerable to the otherness of the other – creation. The act of 
creating itself may therefore be understood as kenosis.36 
The self-withdrawal of God also implies that creation is devoid of divine characteristics 
and is therefore finite. God created the world in Godself, giving it time in God’s eternity, 
finitude within God’s infinity, space within God’s omnipresence, freedom within God’s 
love.37 Indeed, “time is an interval in eternity, finitude is a space in infinity.”38 This 
                                                 
27  See Moltmann 1985:76f on the notion of creatio ex amore Dei.  
28  On the compassion of God, see Moltmann 1990:178ff. 
29  Moltmann 1981:36-42. 
30  On the significance of the Sabbath for an ecological theology, see Moltmann 1985 & 1989:61-66, 80-87. 
31 Moltmann (1985:88, 146 1996:299) acknowledges that God as the living space of the world is a motherly 
metaphor, but does not develop the obvious suggestion of creation taking place within a divine womb. 
Johnson (1992:234) criticises Moltmann’s exclusive use of male metaphors as a ‘blatant anomaly’. In The 
coming of God (1996:300-301). Moltmann does mention the experience of space by a fetus in the uterus. This 
is an ecological experience of Geborgenheit. The fetus (that is not the mother) grows for nine months ‘in’ the 
mother. When the mother gives birth to the child she allows the child a certain independence. Moltmann 
concludes that human beings are both inhabitants and inhabited. This provides an analogy for the Christian 
affirmation that Christ is ‘in’ us but that we are also ‘in’ Christ. See Elizabeth Johnson (1992:233f) for one 
example of such a quintessentially female perspective on the notion of zimsum. 
32  Farrow 1998:428. 
33 Moltmann’s discussion of the notion of zimsum is derived from the kabbalistic tradition, retrieved by Isaac 
Luria, who argues that God’s indwelling in the temple (Shekinah) is only possible if the infinite God contracts 
the divine presence. See already Moltmann (1981:108f) and in more detail (1985:86-93). He again builds on 
this notion in The coming of God (1996:281, 296f).  
34 This does not mean that creation takes place ‘out of God’ (which would suggest a monistic form of emanation 
for which Moltmann criticises Tillich). The world was created neither out of pre-existent matter, nor out of the 
divine Being itself. It was called out of being by the free resolve of God, and, more specifically, out of the 
ecstatic love of God. See Moltmann 1985:75f, also 1996:306. 
35  Moltmann 1981:110. 
36 A kenotic understanding of God in terms of self-restricting, self-emptying love is the motive behind 
Moltmanns’s emphasis on the notion of zimsum (see Moltmann 1985:88, also Torrance 1997:90). In Science 
and wisdom Moltmann (1993:63) adds: “A love which gives the beloved space, allows them time, and asks 
and expects of them freedom is the power of lovers who can withdraw in order to allow the beloved to grow 
and to come. Consequently it is not just self-giving which belongs to creative love; it is self-limitation too; not 
only affection, but respect for the unique nature of the other as well.” 
37 Moltmann 1981:109. 
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finitude, I suggest, includes a limited duration (and mortality for living organism) but also 
transience and limitations to (human) power and knowledge.39  
However, there is more at stake here. This self-withdrawal of God leads to empty space 
that is to be filled by the emergence of creatures. Moltmann describes this in terms of the 
emergence of a nihil, which is a partial negation of divine being, but not the negation of 
creaturely being.40 This does not imply that nothingness forms part of God’s being from all 
eternity, but that the emergence of nothingness forms the reverse side of God’s 
withdrawing. It is this void, being threatened by a primordial nihil, which accounts for 
much of the suffering in the world. It was out of chaos, darkness and flood that God created 
the world.41 The only response available to God is to re-occupy this vacated space – namely 
through the Spirit and the incarnation of Christ. This prompts Moltmann’s panentheistic 
pneumatology and eschatology as we will see below. 
Several of Moltmann’s critics have concluded on this basis that, despite his intentions to 
the contrary, he cannot affirm the goodness of creation consistently. Creation is faulted 
because of the finitude and suffering that is inescapably embedded in creation. His verdict on 
creation is that it is ‘very good’ but not perfect. Only the Sabbath, the promise of future 
consummation built into the initial creation, is sanctified.42 I will return to this aspect below. 
 
The Suffering Embedded in Evolutionary History  
The history of creation is portrayed by Moltmann as a history of suffering. He makes it 
quite clear that the sources of suffering cannot be restricted to the predicament of evil and 
sin.43 Suffering and death also forms an integral part of God’s good creation. Moltmann 
says: “We cannot say ‘if there were no sin, there would be no suffering.’ Experience of 
suffering goes far beyond the experience of guilt and the experience of grace. It has roots in 
the limitations of created reality itself.”44 It is not merely guilt but ultimately death that 
                                                                                                                            
38  Moltmann 1981:111. 
39  See my analysis of these dimensions of finitude (Conradie 2005:144-149). 
40 Moltmann (1985:87) describes this nihil as God-forsaken space, even as hell and absolute death. This creates 
the possibility (but not the actuality) of the demonic. This seems to assume that evil is a more or less 
necessary product of creation and that the Creator is therefore the author of evil – which would render the 
notion of a primordial nihil rather problematic. 
  Moltmann’s use of the notion of zimsum has subsequently been severely criticized, especially by Bouma-
Prediger (1995:254f; 1997), Farrow (1998), Torrance (1997) and Walsh (1987). Farrow (1998:437) concludes 
that, “Nothing could be more curious, it must be said, than the ease with which Moltmann takes up this 
dubious kabbalistic notion, defends and elaborates it with bizarre literalism, and gives it such enormous 
theological weight.” Torrance (1997:90) observes that the notion of zimsum (which is a response to God’s 
omnipresence) assumes spatial categories. It suggests that ‘a kind of primal mystical space’ (1981:110) is 
created, or, more precisely, vacated temporally prior to the creation event. This tends to encourage a container 
or receptacle model of space and a linear notion of time (where creatio ex nihilo is prior to the creatio 
originalis and creatio continua). Bouma-Prediger (1997) comments that, for Moltmann, the self-limitation of 
God assumes a primordial nihil as a necessary condition of the world to exist. The eschaton constitutes a 
refilling of this nihil. In that case, a distinction between God and creation becomes difficult to maintain in the 
eschaton. The eschaton requires a redeeming annihilatio nihili in which God gathers the nothingness into 
God’s own being (Moltmann 1985:90-3).  
  It should be noted that these criticisms are based on Moltmann’s work prior to The coming of God where 
he still uses the notion of zimsum, but balances this with the notion of ‘aeonic’ or relative eternity (see the 
discussion below). 
41  See already Moltmann 1968:26. 
42  Moltmann 1996:264. 
43  Moltmann (1981:52) says: “Suffering as punishment for sin is an explanation that has a very limited value.” 
44 Moltmann 1981:50-51. Schuurman (1987:61) regards the denial that there ever was a pristine state of creation 
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makes the past irretrievably past.45 If suffering is understood to have its roots in creaturely 
reality (and not merely in terms of the legacy of human sin), then sin itself may be 
understood as the more or less inevitable result of human fear of death – and not only the 
fear of God. Moltmann says: “The frailty of the temporal creation of human beings is like a 
detonator for the sin of wanting to be equal to God and to overcome this frailty.”46 Death in 
its natural form, Moltmann maintains, is implied in the command to be fruitful and 
multiply. Sin and death are therefore dialectically related to one another. Sin enters human 
existence through fear of death and death (especially as the consequence of violence) 
follows on sin.  
Although he acknowledges that to explain suffering is to excuse it, Moltmann does, 
after all, offer an explanation for suffering. He explains the inexplicable in terms of the 
most common explanation available, namely that suffering is entirely natural.47 Likewise, 
Moltmann offers an explanation for the emergence of human sin. He describes sin as the 
‘self-closing of open systems’.48 The effect of both sin and nature’s ‘bondage to transience’ 
is therefore a (premature) closure. Sin is born from human finitude, from fear of death. In 
this way sin also becomes entirely natural, perhaps even inevitable.  
This implies that redemption has to include redemption from the suffering embedded in 
creation.49 It cannot be understood merely in terms of overcoming human alienation from 
God as a result of sin. Divine righteousness embraces forgiveness of guilt and the 
annihilation of death together (the negation of the negative).50  
 
The History of Salvation 
The history of creation is for Moltmann not only a history of suffering but also of God’s 
passionate and compassionate love. It is a history through which God seeks to overcome 
the alienation between Creator and creation without abolishing the distinction between the 
two. This is possible through God’s re-entering the godforsaken world.51 Here Moltmann’s 
panentheism (or theo-en-pan-ism) is crucial: God is not absent but present in creation – 
through the Messiah, but especially through the Shekinah of God’s Spirit.52 The ontological 
gap between Creator and creation is overcome through God’s reoccupation of creation, but 
                                                                                                                            
as “...a collapsing of the traditional distinction between creation and fall” leading to “a very negative 
assessment of the limitations of that creation which, as Augustine so often said, God called very good.”  
45 Moltmann 1967:267.  
46  Moltmann 1996:91. 
47  See Farrow 1998:437. 
48 Moltmann 1979:122. 
49  Farrow (1998:437) describes the price that is paid for establishing the solidarity of God with a suffering world 
in the following way: “suffering belongs to God qua God, not only in redemption, but in creation. It belongs 
to creatures, then, just as they come from the hand (or should we say the womb) of God. Sin too becomes 
more or less inevitable since according to Moltmann it proceeds from the fear of death rather than from a 
failure to fear God. Salvation history, like the fall, is so absorbed into the process of making the world that the 
distinction between creation and redemption threatens to collapse.” 
50  See already Moltmann 1967:206. 
51  Walsh (1987:75) comments: “Redemption, then is not primarily a restoration of a covenantal relationship with 
God broken in history, but a ‘re-filling’ of that space, an overcoming of God’s self-limitation by means of an 
annihilatio nihili. But if this nihil was for some reason necessary for the creatio originalis then how can the 
God / creation distinction still be maintained when this nihil is vanquished and God is all in all? Is the 
distinction between pantheism and panentheism only semantic?” 
52  If I am not mistaken there remains a tension between Moltmann’s early emphasis on adventus (picked up 
again in the title of The coming of God) and his somewhat later emphasis on immanent presence. How could 
Christ be coming towards us from ahead and be present at the same time? 
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then in a perichoretic way so that creation is not overwhelmed by God’s presence.53 The 
history of salvation is the history of God’s reoccupation of the vacated space in order to 
transfigure the whole of creation towards participation in the life of God. This destiny is 
anticipated in the Sabbath and in the Christian Eucharist. 
For Moltmann the cross of Jesus Christ constitutes the turning point in the dialectic 
narrative of God’s work. The cross is seen in terms of the solidarity of God with a suffering 
creation, God’s vicarious love for the godforsaken world threatened by annihilation, and the 
protest of divine love against the suffering of creation.54 The cross of Christ is the sign of 
God’s solidarity for all those who live here in the shadow of the cross.55 God enters the 
nothingness (which resulted from God self-withdrawal) by drawing it into God’s own 
being.56 Here God is not dead; death is taken up within God.57 The alienating otherness of 
creation is overcome when such otherness is taken up in God’s own being. Moreover, being 
abandoned by God becomes something that took place within Godself.58 The cross in this 
way becomes a symbol for theodicy and not so much for soteriology. What is at stake here 
is a response to the theodicy problem: The justification of God, not of sinners. Farrow 
comments: “It is primarily the justification of God the creator by God the redeemer.”59 Here 
the crucified God is the only response available to the reproach that God created suffering, 
death and evil together with the world and humanity.60 Perhaps Moltmann’s deepest 
intuition is expressed precisely here. 
It should nevertheless be noted here that Moltmann throughout his oeuvre seeks to 
overcome the separation of a theology of creation and redemption. In his work on creation 
he stresses the redemptive thrust of God’s acts of creation in the beginning, continuing 
creation and new creation. Likewise, in his discussion of redemption, he stresses the 
creative thrust of God’s acts of redemption.61 
Moltmann’s understanding of the sources of suffering prompts a theology of redemption 
                                                 
53  As Farrow (1998:431) observes, “the thrust of an immanentist pneumatology is not to link the world in need 
of redemption to its redeemer … but to link it directly to God.”  
54  Moltmann’s position here constitutes a radical departure from Anselm’s understanding of salvation in terms of 
penal substitution – where Christ died on behalf of humanity who has become estranged from God as a result 
of sin. In an interesting analysis in The crucified God Moltmann (1974:64f) distinguishes between four 
dimensions of the cross of Christ who died for the godless: a) the need to follow Christ in a world full of idols 
and demons; b) the cross of the Christian martyrs; c) solidarity with abandoned and despised human beings; 
and d) the groaning of the enslaved creation, the sorrow of the godless world. In each case Moltmann 
emphasises the victims of suffering, resists relating such suffering to human sin and certainly avoids a 
universalising of sin. See also the discussion below. 
55  Moltmann 1975:57. 
56  In Theology of hope Moltmann (1967:198) describes the resurrection in terms of “a new totality which 
annihilates the total nihil”. 
57  Moltmann 1975:83. 
58  See Moltmann 1974:151. He stresses that it is this godforsakeness alone which distinguishes the cross of Jesus 
Christ from the many crosses of forgotten and nameless people in history (1974:152). 
59  Farrow 1998:446, note 63. See Moltmann (1967:207) though: “justification means that God justifies man [sic] 
by grace and that man acknowledges God’s justice in confessing his sins.” 
60  See Moltmann 1981:40, drawing from insights of Miguel de Unamuno. 
61  This dual emphasis is evident from all Moltmann’s later writings where he has recognised the need to address 
ecological concerns. See, for example, Moltmann 1990:274-312. More than most other contemporary authors 
Moltmann sees the twofold dangers of separating creation from redemption. As I will argue below, questions 
remain over his own ability to maintain an affirmation of the goodness of creation consistently. To stress the 
redemptive thrust of creation may help to recognise the forces of chaos and death embedded in creation (as 
creatura). However, if creation itself is in need of redemption, from the beginning as it were, then redemption 
(as nova creatio) would tend to replace a creation that was faulted from the beginning. Then it would no 
longer be this earth, this body, this life that is redeemed.  
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that moves away from an Anselmian notion of expiatory suffering for human sins towards 
what Gustaf Aulén described as the Christus victor tradition: Victory over the forces of 
death, liberation from oppression and an end to suffering.62 This aspect of his position 
requires further investigation here:63 
In The crucified God Moltmann argues that the notion of expiatory suffering typically 
does not and cannot do justice to the resurrection of Christ and therefore does not interpret the 
cross in terms of the resurrection.64 Instead, for Moltmann, the question raised by the 
resurrection is the theodicy question: Why was only this man raised? The answer to the 
question lies in the cross. The message is that through his representative suffering the risen 
Christ brings righteousness and life to the unrighteous and the dying.65 Jesus was therefore 
merely the first to be raised and hence all people can live from the expectation of the 
resurrection of the dead. While Moltmann thus recognises the sins of the unrighteous, he links 
that in one breath to the suffering and dying of the whole of creation. In this way the ‘for us 
and our salvation’ of Nicene Christianity provides a response to the theodicy problem. 
In The church in the power of the Spirit Moltmann offers an exposition of the doctrine 
of justification in an attempt to overcome the tension between a theological understanding 
of the church and the empirical reality of the church. He does this on the basis of the 
Lutheran notion of simul iustus et peccator. His interpretation follows the tension between 
reality (peccator in re) and hope (iustus in spe). He again emphasises the revolutionary 
power unleashed by this hope and its impact on the sanctification of Christian life and on 
society.66 He also stresses that the justification of the unrighteous is not merely an aim in 
itself, but that it points beyond itself to the lordship of Christ. Moreover, it points towards 
the work of the Spirit, namely towards the believer’s freedom from sin, liberation from 
godless powers, the redemption of the body and the new creation.67 He thus describes 
salvation in three consecutive sections in terms of ‘liberation from the compulsion of sin’, 
‘liberation from the idols of power’ and ‘liberation from godforsakenness’.68  
This notion of abandonment probably reflects Moltmann’s deepest intuition. It seems 
that godforsakenness is here not so much a response from God to human corruption; it 
reflects the more or less necessary self-withdrawal of God, in order to allow creation to be 
itself, but leading to suffering and death in creation. Accordingly, justification is not 
understood primarily in terms of forgiveness offered to sinners (perpetrators, those who are 
guilty) out of God’s grace. Instead, he seeks to understand justification from the point of 
view of the victims, the oppressed, the suffering. Even where he uses the term ‘justification 
for sinners’ Moltmann stresses the liberating impact of such forgiveness.69 This creates a 
tendency to move from a word of pardon in response to wrongdoing towards God’s word of 
affirmation. 
                                                 
62 For Moltmann, salvation in history may be understood as the divine opening of closed systems (1979:122). 
Accordingly, he characterises sin as closing off possibilities and grace as opening them up.  
63  For a discussion of Moltmann’s position on justification within the context of ecological theology, see the 
chapter on Moltmann in the doctoral dissertation by Ariane Arpels-Josiah (2005). 
64  Moltmann 1974:183. 
65  Moltmann 1974:185. 
66  Moltmann 1977:21-24. 
67  Moltmann 1977:31-35. Moltmann (1977:36) adds: “Man’s history in its relation to the history of Christ begins 
with the forgiveness of sins and his being freed for a new life. There can be no other beginning for the 
unrighteous, the unfree and the hopeless. But the beginning does not lead immediately to the end. Liberation 
leads to liberated life. Justification leads to the new creation.” 
68  Moltmann 1977:87-98. 
69  See for example Moltmann 1977:292. 
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In The way of Jesus Christ Moltmann again offers a brief discussion of justification. 
Here he acknowledges the liberating power of forgiveness of sin (understood as closing 
oneself off from the source of life). However, he suggests that justification cannot be 
narrowly confined to forgiveness; it also includes the notion of new life in righteousness. 
His point here is again that an emphasis on forgiveness on the basis of expiation cannot do 
justice to Christ’s resurrection.70 This would reduce Christ’s resurrection to the divine 
endorsement of the salvific significance of his death. Instead, Moltmann emphasises that 
the purpose of justification is that that there may be a just world for all created beings.71  
This is most evident in Moltmann’s discussion of the doctrine of justification in The 
Spirit of life. Here he notes the way in which sin (and salvation) is universalised in the 
Pauline literature and through Protestant theology. However, he also notes that the category 
of ‘sinners’ is not universalised in the same way in the synoptic gospels. Here the category 
of ‘sinners’ refers to the outcasts, the poor and the homeless. Although Moltmann 
acknowledges that people can be both victims and perpetrators, that victims can become 
perpetrators, and that there are some not so innocent onlookers too, he suggests that a 
distinction between victims and perpetrators is justifiable.72 He argues that a universal 
concept of sin makes people blind to specific manifestations of injustice and guilt. The 
universality of sin thus tends to mystify sin and to make sin so abstract that it becomes 
innocuous to confess one’s sins.  
For Moltmann, justification as the affirmation of life entails more than forgiveness of 
sin; it also responds to the ‘cry for justice’ of the victims of injustice.73 Accordingly, 
Moltmann offers a reinterpretation of the doctrine of justification through the eyes of 
liberation theology, namely the liberation of people deprived of justice (justice for victims) 
and the liberation of the unjust themselves (justice for perpetrators). He does that on the 
basis of the category of an affirmation of life. Those who are being affirmed by God are 
primarily the social outcasts, those who are not accepted in society, the marginalised, the 
victims of injustice. Affirmation here implies solidarity with the victims and the affirmation 
of human dignity – also the dignity of those who are trampled upon – and an affirmation of 
the value of every life and every form of life. It is noteworthy that his chapter on ‘The 
justification of life’ follows after a chapter of ‘The liberation for life’.74 
Finally, in a chapter on ‘Deliver us from evil’ in his book In the end – the beginning, 
Moltmann again treats the doctrine of justification.75 Here he distinguishes even more 
explicitly between the victims and the perpetrators of evil. He argues that the righteousness 
of God should be understood first of all in terms of God’s compassion for and solidarity 
with the suffering victims, those who are described as ‘sinners’ by the powerful elite. It is 
therefore a righteousness which brings about justice for the outcasts, the poor, the widows 
and the orphans – as illustrated in the ministry of Jesus the Christ. This justice implies that 
God through Jesus Christ judges between perpetrators and their victims. God judges 
                                                 
70  Moltmann (1990:186) says: “The Lutheran theology of the Reformation period based justifying faith solely on 
the suffering and death of Christ ‘for us’.  But this was one-sided.  They perceived the pro nobis in Christ’s 
cross, but not in his resurrection.  They therefore understood the justification of the sinner too narrowly as ‘the 
forgiveness of sins,’ but not as new life in righteousness.” 
71  Moltmann 1990:183-189. 
72  Moltmann 1992:125, also 2000:107. 
73  See also Moltmann 2004:56f. 
74  Moltmann 1992:99-122 and 123-143. 
75  Moltmann 2004:53-78. 
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perpetrators in the face of their victims.76 Moltmann acknowledges that the apostle Paul 
takes as his premise a universal concept of sin and does not distinguish between the 
perpetrators and the victims of evil. However, he interprets Paul’s message as one aimed 
primarily at perpetrators. He notes that the deeds of perpetrators can never be undone. The 
perpetrators are therefore dependant on their victims if they are to be liberated from their 
evil. They have to be forgiven by their victims. How is this possible? Moltmann suggests 
that this is only possible by God’s own actions, namely through the suffering, cross and 
resurrection of Jesus Christ. He rejects the notion that Jesus died as the vicarious victim for 
our sins, paying off the debts of the perpetrators in some heavenly bank as it were.77 Instead 
he suggests (somewhat vaguely) that the demonstration of God’s solidarity with the 
victims, God’s pain and God’s own godforsakeness may free both the victims (because it 
releases them from the torment of remembrance) and the perpetrators (who are enslaved by 
their own repressed guilt). On this basis they may be liberated towards a new life. This is 
for Moltmann the significance of the resurrection through which both victims and 
perpetrators are brought into a just community with God and one another.78 Only through 
this community, where God’s liberating justice is recognised and experienced by both 
victims and perpetrators, does the justification of God become possible.79 Moltmann 
therefore insists that the doctrine of justification cannot be reduced to the forgiveness of 
perpetrators. 
Moltmann carries such a theology of redemption as the affirmation of life (and of 
creation) through towards the hope for the restoration of all things. In The coming of God, 
he offers an extended discussion of the hope for universal salvation (apokatastasis 
panton).80 Here he is careful not to trivialise divine judgement and damnation since his 
prophetic political theology requires from him to maintain the distinction between those 
who are sinners and those who are sinned against.81 The victims of structural violence 
require a just verdict. Indeed, for the victims of history, God’s judgement is a source of joy 
in God’s righteousness and justice, not a threatening and intimidating message.82  
Moreover, Moltmann maintains that in the final judgement God redeems Godself in the 
eyes of the whole of the suffering creation. God’s judgement over sin does not have the 
final word, in the same way that God’s primal blessing given to creation precedes sin, 
Christians may hope that what would come last is the final blessing of the new creation in 
which justice and righteousness dwells.83 This universalist hope, Moltmann argues, is a 
source of joy for the victims of history. They may be consoled to know not just that 
murderers will fail to triumph over their victims, but also that they cannot even remain the 
murderers of their victims for all eternity.84 Moltmann therefore speaks of the doctrine, not 
the heresy, of universal salvation.85 
 
                                                 
76  Moltmann 2004:71. 
77  Moltmann 2004:73. 
78  Moltmann 2004:74-76. 
79  Moltmann 2004:78. 
80  Moltmann 1996:235-255. 
81  On the theme of divine judgement, see also Moltmann 1969:47f, 1990:334f.  
82  Moltmann 1996:235. 
83  Moltmann 1996:237. 
84  Moltmann 1996:255. 
85  Moltmann 1996:250ff) grounds this hope in the cross of Jesus Christ and in his damnation through the descent 
into hell. If Christ has been damned, then nobody would need to suffer eternal damnation. 
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The Mission of God and of the Church 
On this basis, the history of redemption may be understood as the ongoing solidarity of God 
with a suffering creation through the liberative presence of the Spirit. In his earlier work 
Moltmann emphasised that God’s promise for the renewal of all things necessitates the 
mission of the church to all nations.86 There is a necessary correlation between promissio 
and missio. God’s promise turns our eyes not towards some primeval original event, but 
towards the eschatological fulfilment of God’s promise.87 Moltmann therefore calls for a 
theology born out of hope and not merely one about hope.88 The mission and ministries of 
‘the church in the power of the Spirit’ is characterised by a militant hope that confronts the 
many manifestations of suffering. Moltmann stresses that it is not so much that the church 
‘has’ a mission; instead the mission of Christ creates the church. Mission does not emerge 
from the church; the church emerges from God’s mission (missio Dei). Likewise, the 
church does not possess the gospel; the gospel creates the exodus church.89 The purpose of 
mission is not to spread the church, but to spread the kingdom.90 Moltmann says: “It is not 
the church that has a mission of salvation to fulfil to the world; it is the mission of the Son 
and the Spirit through the Father that includes the church, creating a church as it goes on its 
way.”91 
Through its missionary practice the church does not search for eternal orders in the 
existing reality of the world, but for possibilities that exist in the world in the direction of 
the promised future.92 The forward-moving, history-making mission in this way provides 
the link between coming history and past history.93 Mission here is understood especially in 
terms of the ministries of the laity which include work in the areas of socialisation, 
democracy, education and politics.94 This hope is based on the resurrection of Christ and 
the apostolic witnesses that something new is emerging. The Easter experiences evoke a 
calling.95 Mission constitutes the church as an exodus church, the pilgrim people of God, a 
people liberated from the land of captivity expecting liberation for the whole enslaved and 
suffering creation.96 In a world fluctuating between the glory of self-realisation and the 
misery of self-estrangement, a world of lost horizons, of hopelessness, the task of the 
Christian church is to disclose to the world the horizon of the future of the crucified 
Christ.97 
While there is a strong emphasis in his early work on the mission of the church as the 
corollary of God’s promissio, there seems to be, if I am not mistaken, a tendency in his later 
work to trivialise the mission and ministry of the church.98 This may be understandable 
                                                 
86  Moltmann 1967:225, also 2000:102. 
87  Moltmann 1967:298. 
88  Moltmann 1975:45, 2000:92-93. 
89  Moltmann 1977:84. The influence of Van Ruler’s theology of the apostolate is evident here. 
90  Moltmann 1977:10-11.  
91  Moltmann 1977:64.  
92  Moltmann 1967:288. 
93  Moltmann 1967:284. 
94  Moltmann 1975:11. On ecclesiology written from the perspective of the laity, see also Moltmann 1978. 
95  Moltmann 1970:35. 
96  Moltmann 1977:83.  
97  Moltmann 1967:338. These phrases are derived from the very last lines of Theology of hope. 
98  Moltmann (2008:202) acknowledged that church adherence is for him not a matter of course since he did not 
grow up in a church. Perhaps Moltmann’s position here is best understood as a persistent critique of the 
German Volkskirche. He comments that ‘people’ in the New Testament may be understood as Israel (laos), as 
the Gentile peoples (ethne) and as those living without the law (ochlos) – the poor and homeless with whom 
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given Moltmann’s earlier publications in this regard and since he stresses that he does not 
seek to be comprehensive. He seems to put more and more emphasis on the universal scope 
of the Spirit’s life-affirmation wherever suffering is manifested (also outside the church).  
Already in The church in the power of the Spirit he could maintain that wherever people 
take up their cross in self-giving and wherever the sighing of the Spirit is heard in the cry 
for freedom, there the church is constituted.99 Here he describes the church as “the fellow-
ship of the godless who have found fellowship with God through Jesus’ abandonment by 
God.”100 There are no chapters in either The Way of Jesus Christ or in The Spirit of Life on 
the church as a messianic community (the ‘body of Christ’) or as communion in the 
Spirit.101  
In The Spirit of Life there is a chapter on charismatic powers, but here too the emphasis 
is not on the church but on the ways in which the charismata may empower life.102 In a 
chapter on the ‘fellowship of the Spirit’ the emphasis is on the vocation of the laity. There 
is only a brief mentioning of the gathering of Christians in the church and even there the 
emphasis is not on those who are ‘churchgoing’ but on the presence of the church in 
worldly contexts – where people live and work and in the context of civil society.103 There 
are sections on the community of generations the community between women and men, 
action groups and self-help groups, but nothing on groups formed within the institutional 
church (cell groups, Bible study groups, youth groups, women’s groups, etc). There is very 
little indeed about the church as worshipping community or as local congregation.104 One 
may conclude that Moltmann’s theology does not present a church dogmatics’ it is indeed 
an exercise in imagination for the reign of God.105 
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Jesus associated (see 2008:206). This suggests a concept of church where the focus is on solidarity with 
suffering. 
99  Moltmann 1977:65. 
100  Moltmann 1977:96. 
101  For similar observations, see Smit 2006:75f. Perhaps Moltmann own theological journey plays a role here as 
well. He often observes that, having grown up in a secular home, he discovered the church only after his 
release from the concentration camp in Norton Camp. On Moltmann’s ecclesiology, see also Rasmusson 
1994. 
102  See Moltmann 1992:180f. 
103  See Moltmann 1992:234. 
104  See the brief discussion in Moltmann 1992:245-6 on social forms of the church where four such groups are 
mentioned: voluntary groups, the local congregation, regional and national churches and the age of world-
wide humanity. 
105  Moltmann 1996:xiv. 
